Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 – background and political milieu – selected issues

On 16 March 2014, the TVN24 website published an article by Grzegorz Kuczyński “Six reasons why Russia’s annexation of Crimea would be a no-payoff play”. The author cites rather rational arguments that to annex Crimea does not necessarily have to be the best solution for Russia, even if it actually wants to subdue all of Ukraine.

The website had published the piece two days before the annexation of Crimea was actually declared, so the author had some grounds to claim that Russia would not opt for a scenario which would lead to massive geopolitical turmoil in our region and, over time, trigger a full-scale war. Grzegorz Kuczyński, like many experts considering the potential consequences of the annexation of Crimea, could assume that Vladimir Putin’s decision-making was rational. Rationality in this case was to be understood as democratic states and systems understand it, that is, as reckoning with the economic and social effects of decisions made. From this perspective, the author points out that the decision to annex would entail a huge financial burden on Russia, that Russia would have to carry the can of radicalization among Muslim population in Crimea, or alienation of Belarus and other post-Soviet states in their rapprochement with Russia. The author believes that if Russia refrains from annexing Crimea, it will gain a good bargaining chip in its negotiations with the West. Putin, however, chose a completely different path than the one the article might have suggested.

Two days after Kuczynski’s analysis had been published, Putin formally annexed Crimea by signing the “Treaty between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Crimea on the Accession of the Republic of Crimea to the Russian Federation and the Formation of New Constituent Entities of the Federation”, in a show of an outright brutal force and his unpredictability. Money was none of his concern, as he had been preparing for the war for a long time, and like every ruler of Russia, regardless of its political structure or system at a specific time, he knew that conquered territories serve exploitation, not investment. The Crimean Tatars were none of his concern, as he remembered what Stalin had done with the Tatars and assumed that he would simply “squeeze” the Tatars out of Crimea. Putin was not worried that any country might turn its back on him, and he was specifically not afraid of this with regard to Belarus, which he also intended to colonize and perhaps annex in due time. Neither was Putin worried about any Western sanctions, as he knew that he still had the energy strings in his hands, which he had long been skilfully using in his games in relations with the West. Also, he had long been mounting a lobbying effort in the West to back his policy, no matter how brutal it might have been. His list of paid lobbyists included Western politicians, their families and journalists. After the killings in Chechnya and Georgia, he already knew that all the world’s outrage would quickly fade away. 

This somewhat journalistic introduction demonstrates that any attempt to grasp Russia’s actions escapes universal logic, knowledge and understanding of facts as Western civilization approaches these, and the obvious cause-and-effect model.

To understand the actions of Putin’s Russia therefore requires a deeper delve into the ideology that the current Russian leader follows.

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